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This paper argues that under a commercial export milk program the market value of quota will 
be determined by the spread between the domestic market price and the export price rather than 
the conventional wisdom that it is determined by the spread between the domestic milk price and 
the marginal cost of production.  Under this new economy it was argued that ultimately the 
market price of dairy quota will be priced independently of firm marginal costs, which implies 
that low cost (or high margin) producers will not hold an economic advantage in bidding for 
quota over higher cost producers.  Regression results are consistent with the hypothesized 
positive relationship between quota values and the difference between domestic and export milk 
price.  The average export price has generally increased over time and is approximately equal to 
the marginal cost for an average producer.  The results have implications for the WTO 
challenge.  New Zealand and US feel the domestic program acts as an export subsidy by cross-
subsidizing production of commercial export milk.  The results here suggest that the prices for 
the filled export contracts are approximately the marginal cost of production for the average 
producer, and not lower as suggested by the challenge.  Export contracts were found to have 
higher price risk than domestically produced milk.  The risk is compounded by the short-term 
nature of most export contracts.  The increase in risk for the CEM implies that it is unlikely many 
farmers will greatly diversify into CEM contracts unless the uncertainty is reduced. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  The value of the right to produce milk under supply-management is an important issue 
for both individual producers and the dairy sector as a whole.  A single decision-maker needs to 
determine the appropriate amount to bid for quota, and this bid value responds to a number of 
economic variables.  An increase in domestic price, a decrease in marginal costs, expectations 
about future growth in cashflow, and lower costs of capital are all economic variables that could 
lead to an increase in quota bid prices.  Quota prices should also be sensitive to international 
markets.  For example, Lariviere and Meilke (1999) show how economic rents to milk producers 
would decrease with a reduction in tariffs, increased access to the Canadian milk market, and 
reducing or eliminating export subsidies.  As economic rents per unit of output falls, so too will 
  1the price of dairy quota (e.g. Forbes, Hughes and Warley (1982), Mochini and Meilke (1988), 
Barichello (1996), and Chen and Meilke (1998)). 
  The institutional regulations surrounding milk production can also have an impact on the 
value of dairy quota.  Prior to 1995, domestic dairy quota was priced according to the ability of 
lowest cost producers to pay.  Under this regime the value of quota would generally equal the 
present value of the difference between the efficiency output point of average cost and marginal 
cost and the market price of milk.  The introduction of an export class (5e) milk pricing structure 
by the Canadian Dairy Commission in 1995 and of a commercial export milk program in 2000 
has changed considerably the way quota for domestic milk production is valued.  In essence a 
dairy producer of any size can now opt to fill up to 100% of dairy production through export 
contracts.  Under the older regime, there was no available alternative for dairy farmers to market 
their milk outside of provincial milk marketing boards.  In the absence of marketing alternatives, 
dairy milk quota provided the right and obligation to produce and sell milk into the domestic 
market at a regulated price, which is in excess of industry marginal costs.  Under the new 
commercial export milk program (CEM) the definition of dairy quota has changed considerably.  
With the emergence of a parallel marketing alternative to domestic fluid and industrial milk, 
dairy quota no longer provides the right and obligation to produce milk, but instead the right to 
collect a price premium for marketing milk domestically rather than marketing the same milk 
under an optional export contract.  No studies have examined how the availability of export 
contracts outside production quotas will affect the price of quota. 
  The purpose of this paper is to examine how dairy quota is valued when dairy farmers 
have the option to export.  We argue that the program changes are not trivial.  In the first section 
of the paper it is demonstrated that the value of quota now depends only on the spread between 
  2the domestic board price and the export price rather than the spread between domestic prices and 
marginal costs.  We show that some farmers may have the ability to pay more for quota as in the 
old regime but then argue that if the market is efficient, the ability to bid a higher price, under the 
new regime, is largely irrelevant.  Using a mean variance portfolio model it is shown how risk 
and returns can influence the producer's decision to balance production for domestic and/or 
export markets.  An analysis of monthly export prices, domestic Ontario milk prices, and Ontario 
quota prices confirms the theory.  The paper concludes with a discussion on the implications of 
the introduction of export contracts within the supply management regime of the dairy sector.  
The results also have implications for the basis of challenge by New Zealand and the US as to 
the compliance of the commercial milk export program with Canada’s Uruguay agreements to 
export subsidy levels.  
 
THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF QUOTA 
  As with any other capital asset, the value of quota will equal the present value of the 
anticipated cashflow arising from the rights of production that it confers.  Along with this right 
comes certain obligations, which include a continual balance of butterfat percentage and volume 
of milk produced.  In the following section it is assumed that the quota value reflects fully the 
obligation to deliver a certain quantity of butterfat with no allowance for penalties associated 
with over or under production.  We will demonstrate how incremental cashflows, and 
consequently the value of quota, differ under a supply management system with and without the 
availability of export contracts and in the presence of uncertainty. 
 
 
  3Quota Values in the Absence of the CEM  
  Prior to the commercial export market (CEM), annual incremental cashflows from dairy 
production on a per litre basis (ADM) were covered by 
(1) ADM = Max [Pd - MC - QA, 0] 
where Pd is the domestic price of milk under supply management, MC is the marginal cost of 
producing milk, and QA is the amortized value of quota on a per hectoliter (hl) basis.  Since a 
dairy farmer could only sell on the domestic market, a farmer choosing to produce for this 
market would receive an annual net return per litre of Pd - MC - QA or the farmer would not 
produce any milk if the incremental cashflows were negative.  Equation (1) places a maximum 
on the amortized value of quota, (QA < Pd-MC) and subsequently the amount a farmer would bid 
for quota.   
To illustrate the influence of production costs on the bid price for quota, consider the case 
in Figure 1 with two producers having different marginal cost curves, MC1 and MC2.  Both 
producers face the same domestic price Pd and for simplicity both produce at S
*.  The maximum 
amount they are willing to pay for an extra unit of quota is Pd - MC1 for producer 1 and Pd - MC2 
for producer 2.  The maximum amortized value of quota under supply management, QA
DM*, is 
the difference between the domestic price and the producer's individual marginal cost.  Neither 
producer would purchase quota if the amortized value at its present market price (QA
Mkt) is such 
that QA
Mkt > QA
DM* = Pd - MC.  To summarize, producer i has two choices when producing only 
for the domestic market (DM): 
 buy  quota  if     Pd - MCi =QA i
DM* > QA
Mkt 
  stay at S
* (or sell quota) if     QA
Mkt > QA i
DM* = Pd - MC i. 
  4Farmers with lower marginal costs such as producer 2 in Figure 1 are able to out-bid producers 
with higher marginal costs such as producer 1.  We will assume that farmers do not sell quota if 
QA
Mkt > QA i
DM* but rather keep at S* due to the influence of quota appreciation.  Canadian dairy 
farmers tend to sell either all their quota if they are exiting the industry or none at all so the 
assumption of keeping production constant is appropriate for a dairy producer continuing to 
farm. 
  Quota prices are presently settled in Ontario on a bid-ask basis once a month with the 
final price equating supply and demand.  During each month individual farmers desiring quota 
place a bid with the exchange (the maximum price at which they are willing to buy) while those 
selling quota set ask prices (the minimum price at which they are willing to sell).  Both buyers 
and sellers state the amount and type of quota they are willing to buy or sell.  Note that there will 
be a distribution of bid prices with the maximum bid price determined by the producer with the 
lowest marginal cost. 
The quota exchange then ranks and accumulates the quantity and price of quota available 
for sale and the quantity and price of quota to be purchased.  The market-clearing price is the 
price at which the quantity offered for sale equals the quantity bid upon.  Since supply equals 
demand all offers to purchase at or above the market clearing price and all offers to sell at or 
below the market-clearing price are satisfied.  To illustrate, assume there are 3 sellers selling one 
unit of quota at prices of 15, 20 and 22 and there are 4 buyers with bid prices of 10, 15, 20 and 
35.  The top bid price (35) is matched with the lowest bid price (15) to begin and the process 
continues until the bid and ask prices are equated.
1  In this example, two units of quota will be 
sold in the market with a unit each sold by the two sellers with the lowest ask prices and a unit 
  5each bought by the two buyers with the highest bid prices.  Both units of quota are exchanged at 
a price of 20.  In essence, the market-clearing price is dictated by the willingness of producers to 
pay for quota, and producers with lower marginal costs are better positioned to bid a higher price 
than those producers with higher marginal costs. 
 
Quota Values in the Presence of the CEM 
  Under the previous regime, dairy producers had no (or limited) options to produce milk 
for markets other than the domestic market implying a zero opportunity cost associated with not 
producing for the domestic market.  This has changed.  Cashflows under the new regime (ACEM) 
are:  
(2) ACEM = Max [Pd - MC - QA, Pe - MC]. 
where Pe is the export price of milk.  To illustrate this change, consider the case of Figure 2 
which introduces the export price, Pe, to Figure 1.  Prior to CEM, the farmer would buy 
additional rights to produce milk provided Pd - MC (i.e. QA
DM* in Figure 1) was greater than the 
amortized value of quota at its current market price (QA
Mkt) as discussed previously.  The 
maximum they would be willing to pay for quota (QA
Max) would vary by individual producer 
depending upon their marginal costs.  With the CEM, the current producer has three mutually 
exclusive choices that can be summarized as: 
 buy  quota  if     Pd - MC - QA
Mkt> Pe - MC >0, or 
  buy an export contact if    Pe - MC > Pd -MC - QA
Mkt> 0, or  
  stay at S
* (or sell quota) if     Pd - MC - QA
Mkt< 0, Pe - MC < 0. 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 Some producers needing quota will submit a bid price significantly higher than the expected clearing price 
knowing that their high bid will not influence the eventual equilibrium price but will ensure them a purchase 
(Doyon, Grant and Brinkman, 2000). 
  6Note it is still assumed that a continuing dairy producer stays at a domestic quota 
level/production of S* even if the incremental returns under both domestic and export production 
are negative due to the expectation of growth in quota value and the real option value to 
remaining in dairy.   
Provided the returns to producing domestically and for commercial export are both 
positive, the choice between buying quota or agreeing to an export contract depends on 
comparing the incremental cashflows from the two options.  The same farm can be active in both 
markets although most participants in the CEM have quota and few rely exclusively on the 
export market (Stoneman, 2001).  The difference between producing for the export market (Pe – 
MC) and the domestic market (Pd - MC - QA
Mkt) can be written on a $/hl basis as  
(3)  B = Pd - Pe - QA
Mkt. 
The basis (B) between producing for the domestic or export market is defined by equation (3) 
and is independent of costs of production.  This wedge between the domestic and export prices 
governs the value of quota.  The basis will take on a positive value if Pd - QA
Mkt > Pe which 
implies that the market price of quota is lower than its opportunity cost.  With a positive basis, 
the producer will increase supply by purchasing quota and no production will shift to the export 
market.  However, if B < 0, then the value of quota exceeds its opportunity cost and the farmer 
will do better by producing additional milk for the export market. 
  In equilibrium neither a positive or negative basis can exist except in a transitory state.  A 
positive basis suggests that producers will bid up the price of quota until marginal benefits of 
holding quota fall to zero.  Thus, the maximum amortized value of quota (QA
CEM*) for a producer 
is the value of QA such that net returns from expanding production for domestic demand through 
additional quota, or for the international market through an export contract, are the same, Pd - 
  7MC - QA
Mkt= Pe - MC.  Thus, QA
CEM* = Pd - Pe, which is the same for both producers in Figure 2.  
If the basis is negative, those holding quota will sell it, increasing supply, and reducing its price.  
In equilibrium all arbitrage opportunities are exploited when 
(4) QA
CEM* - Pd - Pe = 0. 
  Equation (4) states that in equilibrium the market price of quota depends on the spread 
between the domestic milk price and the export price, rather than the marginal cost of 
production.  This means that the bid price for quota is independent of scale, as discussed in 
Figure 2, and that the bid price, and the bidding process no longer favours dairy producers with a 
comparative advantage in size or scale economies. 
 
The Effect of Export Prices on Quota Bid Prices 
The above theory suggests that there are two mutually exclusive formulations for 
calculating the bid price for quota. Using a general approach to asset capitalization (see Baker et 
al, 1990) the bid price formulas are given by 
(5) QVDM = {365 (Pd - MC) / (bf% x 100)} / (r – g) 
for milk produced for the domestic market and 
(6) QVCEM = {365 (Pd - Pe) / (bf% x 100)} / (r –g
*) 
for milk sold under an export contract.  The numerators convert the bid price from a $/hl basis to 
a $/kg butterfat/year basis and convert cash flow in terms of $/hl to a $/kg b.f. basis.  Dairy quota 
provides the right to produce 1 kg/day for 365 days.  If for example bf% = 3.5% then each 
hectoliter of milk produces 3.5 kg of butterfat which means that 3.5 units of quota are required to 
produce 1 hl of milk.  The discount rate would be the same in both cases but there is the 
possibility that anticipated growth in the respective spreads would differ.  In the short run 
  8differences in growth (g) would be attributable to temporal changes in marginal costs and export 
prices but in equilibrium there is no reason to anticipate that they would differ since marginal 
costs would always set the lower boundary for export prices. 
  The two formulations are mutually exclusive since equation (6) would dominate (5) when 
Pe > MC and equation (5) would dominate or be at least equal to (6) when Pe ≤ MC.  Changes in 
anticipated growth will increase the quota values since the spread between the domestic price 
and marginal costs or export prices will increase.  Holding domestic prices constant, the growth 
rate becomes negative and the value of the quota will fall as export prices increase at a rate 
greater than marginal costs.  Assuming equivalent growth rates in the long run, quota values will 
decrease as the costs of capital increase, but further discussion on capital costs is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
 
Risk And The Optimal Milk Marketing Choice 
  The previous sections discussed how the CEM model could affect the market price of 
dairy quota, but did not provide insight into how farmers would choose between producing milk 
for the export market and/or owning quota and producing for the domestic market.  Facing 
different price risks the problem can be viewed in the context of portfolio diversification.  In this 
section, the objective is to provide some base-line comparative statics in a normative framework 
for a representative producer with a negative exponential utility function and a constant absolute 
risk aversion, α. 
  From the first major section of the paper, deterministic, incremental cashflows from 
producing domestically are Pd-MC-QA while the returns to shipping under a commercial export 
contract is Pe–MC.  In this section, returns are stochastic and expected revenue for domestic and 
  9export production are given by E[Pd] and E[Pe] respectively.  Defining the proportion of total 
milk production shipped to domestic processors as λ, the remainder (1-λ) is shipped under export 
contracts.  Expected profits are then given by 
(7) E[Π] = λ(E[Pd] - QA
Mkt) + (1-λ) E[Pe] 













e are the variance of marginal profits when shipping domestically and for export 
respectively and σde captures any covariance between the domestic and export market prices.  
The model assumes for simplicity that quota is perfectly divisible and total milk production is 
fixed so we can look at the problem in terms of a single unit of production (e.g. per hectoliter).  
If it is optimal for an individual producer to increase quota production then profits increase by 
the per unit price less the amortized value of quota purchased.  If quota production is reduced, 
then the export price substitutes for the domestic price and the amortized value of quota is 
returned to the producer upon sale.  Expected utility under the above assumptions is then given 
by 









e + 2λ (1-λ)σde] 
  The optimal proportion to ship under domestic quota is λ
* which is obtained by 
differentiating (9) and solving for λ when ∂ EU(Π)/∂λ=0.  It is  
(10)  2













e - 2 σde. 
Examining the first order conditions of (11) with respect to the price spread reveals that 
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In general ∂λ
*/∂(Pd-Pe) will be positive which means that the proportion of milk entering 
the export market (1-λ*) will decrease as domestic prices rise relative to export prices.  But there 
are two effects.  The first is a pure price effect and its value is 1/ασ
2 holding quota values 
constant.  However, since an increase in the spread could also cause a rise in the price of quota, 
the total effect is somewhat dampened.  If the quota effect over-reacts then it may be possible to 
observe a decrease in domestic production.  This would unlikely be sustainable and in the longer 
run the value ∂QA/∂(Pd-Pe) will likely be less than 1. 
  In terms of risk aversion 
(13)  2 2
) (
σ α α






If the numerator in (13) is positive this suggests, in a mean variance framework, that the risk 
associated with Pd-QA is greater than that associated with Pe.  Consequently λ
*, the proportion of 
milk produced for the domestic market will decrease.  The opposite is true if Pe > Pd-QA. 
More interestingly is the effect of risk on λ























where ρ is the correlation between domestic and export prices.  Then 
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  11The effect of increasing domestic milk price variance on the proportion of milk shipped under 
domestic quota is ambiguous.  The first bracketed term in (15) will be positive if the spread in 
marginal profits between producing under domestic quota and under an export contract {(Pd-QA)-
Pe} is greater than ασ
2
e.  If domestic and export prices are either negatively correlated or 
uncorrelated, then the second bracketed term is positive and ∂λ
*/∂σd < 0.  The correlation 
between domestic and export prices is slightly negative at -0.19 based on price data in Table 2.  
Under these conditions the result states that as domestic price uncertainty rises relative to export 
prices, there will tend to be a decrease in production for the domestic market.  If the price series 
are positively correlated then ∂λ
*/∂σ > 0 for σd/σe <ρ, ∂λ
*/∂σd = 0 for σd/σe = ρ, and ∂λ
*/∂σd < 
0 if σd/σe > ρ.  A positive correlation suggests that increased volatility in the domestic market 
will be matched by a correlated rise in volatility in the export market.  This latter effect would 
generally dampen the overall impact of a change in σd.  It follows by a similar argument that ∂(1-
λ
*)/∂σd> 0 so that a marginal increase in risk in domestic prices will cause an increase in 
production for export markets. 
  The effect of an increase in export price variability provides a symmetrical (and equally 
ambiguous) result to that presented above.  In this case ∂λ
*/∂σe > 0 and ∂(1-λ
*)/∂σe < 0.  As 




Export contracts for milk have been offered to producers in Ontario and Quebec since 
August 2000 and in Manitoba since December 2000.  Characteristics of the contracts for Ontario 
are provided in Table 1 up to November 2001.  The monthly volume of all contracts offered by 
  12processors has been relatively constant for 2001 at around 400,000 liters per month.  During the 
initial periods of the CEM, processors offered significantly more contracts, particularly in the 
November 2000 to January 2001 period when a small number of processors made very large 
requests.  For example, Nestle Canada requested 20 million liters per day at $33.4658 per 
hectoliter in November 2000.  This request did not represent an expectation to fill a specific 
amount but rather it was a signal to the market that Nestle would accept all available production 
at the given price.  Similar activities occurred in December and January with other processors. 
Producer participation in the CEM has been increasing.  Since February 2001, dairy 
farmers have accepted an average of approximately 30% of the contracts made available by 
processors.  The volume filled under export contract now represents about 2% of Ontario's 
current production.   
The average price of filled export contracts has ranged from a low of $29.05 in July 2000 
to a high of $37.90/hl in October 2001.  The theoretical model hypothesized that a producer will 
enter into a commercial export contract if the incremental cashflows from doing so are greater 
than buying additional quota to supply domestically (Pe-MC > Pd-MC-QA
Mkt).  Thus, the increase 
in export price has been matched by increased producer participation in the CEM as expected.  In 
addition, the relationship between export price and marginal costs and the firm’s decision to 
enter into an export contract.  Using the historical record from the Ontario Dairy Farm 
Accounting Project over the years 1995 through 2000 it was found that the cash conversion ratio 
(net operating cashflow/$ of milk sales) was approximately 70%.  On a cash flow basis, this 
implies that the spread between prices received and marginal costs is approximately 30%.   
Applying this value to a base domestic price of $55/hl gives an approximate value for marginal 
  13costs of $38 and the spread between price and cost is $17
2.  According to theory, if farmers are 
going to supply milk to processors for export then the export price must at least cover marginal 
costs on a cash basis.  Throughout 2001 the export price has risen and is approaching the roughly 
estimated average marginal cost of production. 
 
Domestic/Export Milk Prices and Quota Values 
  One of the major findings of the theoretical model is that the market price of quota will 
become more dependent on the spread between the domestic milk price and the export price, 
rather than the marginal cost of production as the export price rises relative to costs.  To 
determine if such a relationship has started to emerge, the price spread and quota values are 
compared.  Table 2 lists the domestic and export prices, price spread and quota price for each 
month from August 2000 to November 2001.  As the spread decreases it is expected from theory 
that quota prices will fall.  In most months, an increase in the price spread is accompanied by a 
corresponding increase in the price of quota.  This is especially true in the January to March 
2001 period.  Thus, it appears that the hypothesized positive relationship between the price 





                                                 
2 The increased spread in prices excludes the amortized cost of quota.  Assuming a 20 year horizon, at a 8%discount 
rate, the amortization factor is 9.818.  The amortized value of quota at $20,000 is then $2,037 per year.   At 3.5% 
butterfat this provides the right to produce 104.28 hl of milk per year or approximately $19.58/hl.  Since the $16.34 
spread occurs before amortization, then it is evident that with an opportunity cost of $19.58/hl the spread between 
domestic and marginal costs is all but exhausted if not negative.  When the opportunity cost of holding quota is 
considered, export prices in the mid $30 range compares directly with current domestic prices.  
  14Uncertainty and Quota Values 
Trade challenges have altered the form of the export milk program in Canada and 
continue to pose a risk to its existence.  The creation of milk class 5(e) by Canada in 1995 was 
challenged by New Zealand in 1997 as a violation of Canada’s export subsidy commitments 
made in the Uruguay Round Agreement.  The US joined the NZ challenge in 1998 and the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Panel ruled in their favour on May 17, 1999.  Canada then created the CEM 
in an attempt to become compliant with the Panel’s report and the subsequent ruling by the 
Appellate Body, which upheld the Panel’s initial decision.  NZ and the US again filed a 
complaint against the form of the CEM in February 2001 (WTO, 2001a).  A second Dispute 
Panel ruled in July 2001 that CEM program was not compliant with Canada’s Uruguay 
commitments putting the future of the program in jeopardy.  Canada again appealed to the 
Appellate Body and this time the Panel’s decision was overturned.  However, the report did not 
state that the CEM was WTO legal suggesting that future challenges are likely. 
The theoretical model suggests that increased uncertainty in the export market will cause 
an increase in quota prices as farmers move to the safety of the domestic market.  The WTO 
ruling masques some of the relationships hypothesized in the theory section, but the total 
relationships can be investigated by simply regressing the value of quota against the price spread 
and including a dummy variable to capture the months of uncertainty between July and 
November 2001 regarding the WTO ruling.  The results of the regression (t stats in parantheses) 
are  
Quota Value = $13,599 + 191.6 * Price Spread + 1,458.7 * WTO       Adj RSquare = 0.12 
                        (4.79)       (1.77)                             (1.99) 
 
  15The results are consistent with the a priori positive relationship hypothesized between the price 
spread and the value of dairy quota.  A $1 increase in the price spread represents a $1 decrease in 
the export price relative to the domestic price so the positive sign is correct.  All other things 
held constant, a $1 increase in the export price will reduce the price of quota on average by 
$191.6/kg
3. 
Likewise, the dummy variable on the WTO ruling is significant and positive.  The WTO 
Dispute Settlement Panel ruling in July 2001 increased uncertainty and ambiguity about the 
future of the CEM program and the export prices that the CEM program could offer.  The result 
clearly indicates that there was a reversion back to domestic and conventional quota valuation.   
Our theory supports the positive effect of the WTO ruling on domestic quota values in 
two forms.  The first is that a successful NZ and US challenge on the CEM would either reduce 
or eliminate export pricing in Canada.  As export prices fall, the spread between the domestic 
and export prices rises and theory indicates that quota values should subsequently rise.  In 
addition, our theory suggests that an increase in uncertainty about the export price will decrease 
the amount of milk shipped for export and the increased supply of milk would need to be shipped 
domestically.  This in turn would increase the demand for domestic quota and prices would rise. 
The WTO ruling clearly indicates that such a response exists.  Over the period July-November 
2001, quota prices rose in direct response to the WTO ruling by about $1,458/kg.  
In general, export prices are transitory and unpredictable.  Without any ties to a cost of 
production formula that can smooth profit margins, export prices will be volatile relative to 
                                                 
3 In equation (12) and its subsequent discussion, we suggested that the derivative ∂QA/∂(Pd-Pe) would be less than 1.  
From the regression, the change in quota value is $191.6.  Assuming that holding period of quota is 20 years and the 
discount rate is 8%, the present value annuity factor that converts this to annuity value is 9.818.  The amortized 
value is therefore $19.515 (191.6/9.818).  The quota provides the right to produce 365 kg bf or 104.28 hl in one 
year.  Dividing $19.515 by 104.28 results in a value less than 1 ($0.187/hl) as suggested following equation (12). 
 
  16domestic prices.  From Table 2 the standard deviation in export prices is 2.41 compared to 1.69 
for domestic prices.  This represents a 42% higher degree of price risk.  A similar result is found 
in the volatility of the percentage changes in the Table 2 prices.  In addition, many export 
contracts are for durations of 3 months or less which creates even further risk and ambiguity.  As 
discussed above, one needs only to look at the impact of the July 2001 WTO Panel judgment in 
favour of the NZ and US challenge to see that an increase in uncertainty or ambiguity about 
export prices will have a significant impact on quota prices.  Given the relationships above, and 
the option to produce milk for the domestic or export markets, it is unlikely that farmers will 
greatly diversify into CEM contracts as long as the price risk relative σe/σd is high.  On the other 
hand, as CEM matures, processors may be able to offer extended forward contracts-to-deliver or 
export price options.  Such contracts will reduce uncertainty and this could encourage some 
farmers to move away from fluid milk production for the domestic market. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
  This paper argues that under a commercial export milk program the market value of 
quota will be determined by the spread between the domestic market price and the export price 
rather than the conventional wisdom that it is determined by the spread between the domestic 
milk price and the marginal cost of production.  Under this new economy it was argued that 
ultimately the market price of dairy quota will be priced independently of firm marginal costs, 
which implies that low cost (or high margin) producers will not hold an economic advantage in 
bidding for quota over higher cost producers.  Regression results are consistent with the 
hypothesized positive relationship between quota values and the difference between domestic 
and export milk price.   
  17The average export price has generally increased over time and is approximately equal to 
the marginal cost for an average producer.  It is unlikely that the export price will fall below the 
marginal costs of production for sustained periods of time since farmers would no longer enter 
into export contracts.  The data supports this finding.  A more complete model of quota pricing 
in equilibrium would set the marginal costs of production as a (lower) boundary condition to the 
export price.  Under this scenario setting the export price equal to marginal production costs 
would result in equivalent pricing models. 
  The effect of risk on the portfolio choice of producing milk for the domestic or export 
markets was also illustrated.  Export contracts were found to have higher price risk than 
domestically produced milk.  The risk is compounded by the short-term nature of most export 
contracts.  The increase in risk for the CEM implies that it is unlikely many farmers will greatly 
diversify into CEM contracts unless the uncertainty is reduced.  Not only does the CEM have 
greater price risk, but has faced greater policy risk regarding its future viability.  The study found 
that during the time period of the successful NZ and US challenge to the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Panel, quota values increased due to the potential reversion back to conventional 
quota valuation and higher risk.   
  The results have implication for the WTO challenge.  New Zealand and US feel the 
domestic program acts as an export subsidy by cross-subsidizing production of commercial 
export milk.  The results here suggest that the prices for the filled export contracts are 
approximately the marginal cost of production for the average producer, and not lower as 
suggested by the challenge.  In addition, the difference between the export price and the 
domestic price is close to the marginal cost of quota for an average producer.   
  18We speculate, but leave for further research, that under conditions of risk the export price 
under a continued CEM program would oscillate between, and be bounded by, the domestic 
marginal production costs as a lower boundary and the U.S. base formula price as an upper 
boundary.  The BFP price will likely form an upper boundary since (in equivalent currencies) an 
export price in excess of the BFP price would encourage U.S. processors to increase exports until 
the market equilibrates.  In fact, the price data in Table 2 shows that the average price has been 
trending upwards towards $40/hl which is very close to the U.S. BFP when converted to 
Canadian dollars.  Since BFP futures price volatility would include the jointness between 
demand and supply it is probably more variable than marginal costs. Furthermore, we would 
conjecture that because there are more degrees of freedom associated with export markets than 
domestic markets the actual volatility of export prices would be greater than the U.S. BFP prices.  
Consequently, we believe that a rigorous analysis of uncertainty in milk prices would reveal that 
the spread between the domestic price and export price would be significantly more volatile than 
the spread between domestic prices and marginal costs.  In our model this increase could be 
represented by a higher discount rate for the CEM regime than the original regime and this in 
turn would actually cause a reduction in the quota bid price.  The implication of this, in a 
positivist sense, is that dairy producers will generally maintain a significant investment in quota.   
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Average Standard Price ($/hl)  
Date  Posted (l)  Contracted (l)  Filled (%)  Posted  Contracted 
July/2000  71,699,707 10,878,808 15.17  26.5821  29.0545 
August 53,035,117  3,780,024  7.13  28.8296  31.9109 
September 45,949,993  2,420,347  5.27  29.4668  33.2457 
October 603,038,290  3,911,791  0.65  32.7310 35.0029 
November 41,077,196  3,562,297  8.67  29.3043  32.8507 
December 3,682,518,801  6,782,204 0.18  29.3220  31.2530 
January/2001 3,687,640,652  9,406,413  0.26  29.3275  30.8224 
February  59,602,259 12,262,314 20.57  28.7928  30.3721 
March  19,439,935 10,549,802 54.27  29.2981  29.6786 
April  26,456,104 10,075,590 38.08  29.5386  29.9658 
May 78,279,774  8,038,822  10.27  29.7637  30.7499 
June 51,415,783  7,058,895  13.73  31.8828  33.0079 
July 36,798,287  6,923,997  18.82  33.3310  34.2882 
August 28,197,173  7,143,025  25.33  34.6147  35.7694 
September 32,870,968  5,636,988  17.15  35.6289  37.1647 
October 14,239,907  6,421,060  45.09  36.1289 37.9049 
November  21,247,702 14,446,736 67.99  33.8032  34.7617 
Average    1.51  31.0792  32.8120 
 
  24Table 2. Relationship Between Domestic Prices, Export Prices, and Quota Values 
 








July/2000 54.47  29.0545  25.4155  17,129 
August 54.77  31.9109  22.8591  17,999 
September 56.36  33.2457  23.1143  17,101 
October 58.15  35.0029 23.1471 18,522 
November 58.41  32.8507  25.5593  20,301 
December 59.69  31.2530  28.4370  19,900 
January/2001 56.29  30.8224  25.4676  19,000 
February 59.54  30.3721  28.9179  19,256 
March 59.50  29.6786  29.8214  19,499 
April 57.40 29.9658  27.4342  18,501 
May 57.90  30.7499  27.1501  17,997 
June 58.41  33.0079  25.4021  17,901 
July 55.84  34.2882  21.5518  18,759 
August 56.28  35.7694  20.5106  20,000 
September 56.17  37.1647  19.0053  19,499 
October 58.68  37.9049 20.7751 18,100 
November 57.66  34.7617  22.8983  18,999 
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